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Introduction
Trade credit is an important source of funds for both small and large firms around the world (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002) . Many firms use trade credit both to finance their input purchases (accounts payable) and offer financing to their customers (accounts receivable).
A number of papers have investigated both the demand and supply side of trade credit.
However, we still know very little about important features of trade credit contracts offered and about whether customers stick to these contract terms. Moreover, there is evidence that small credit constrained firms do offer trade credit (e.g., McMillan and Woodruff, 1999 and Marotta, 2005 ), but it is not clear why they would do that.
Anecdotal evidence (CFO Magazine, April 2007) , suggests that the bargaining power between suppliers and customers is an important driver of both the trade credit terms offered by suppliers and the ones actually used by customers. Bargaining power might also explain why credit-constrained suppliers still offer trade credit: when they are forced by influential buyers to allow delayed repayments of goods.
Motivated by the scarce empirical evidence on trade credit terms and bargaining power, we collect a large and detailed firm-level survey database of Chinese firms. This is a unique source of data for at least two reasons. First, it provides unique information on trade credit contracts, including the amount, terms, and payment history of trade credit extended by firms to their customers (accounts receivable). Second, it provides detailed and rich information about the product market environment (i.e., number of competitors and main competitor's share in the domestic market), the business relation between suppliers and customers and the characteristics of the goods sold on credit.
Our empirical analysis provides a number of intriguing results. First, we document the importance of trade credit as a competitive gesture. Specifically, suppliers with weak bargaining power towards their customers -measured as either the proportion of sales to the largest customer or the number of suppliers of the firm's most important customer -are more likely to extend trade credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit, and offer a longer payment period before imposing penalties. Similarly, firms facing stronger competition in the product market -measured either by the degree of sales concentration in the domestic market, by the introduction of new products, or by lowered product prices in the past year -are more likely to offer trade credit and provide better credit terms. Evidence on customers' repayments practices confirms these findings and suggests that influential customers generate involuntary lending from their weaker suppliers. Specifically, important customers repay slowly their purchases and tend to extend the payment period beyond what has been offered, generating overdue payments.
Finally, we look at how firms finance the provision of trade credit. We find that unused bank credit lines increase credit supply but only for suppliers with weak bargaining power, suggesting that credit-constrained firms are less able to compete in the product market when they most need it. All these findings are consistent with the bargaining power story and hold after controlling for several firm characteristics, including size, ownership, geographical location, market destination of the products, number of customers, and industry dummies.
Our paper contributes to the literature on trade credit along several dimensions. First, our data set provides an ideal setting to effectively test three theories that have linked the buyer/seller bargaining power to trade credit decisions. Specifically, our evidence provides support to the Wilner's (2000) argument that a customer obtains more trade credit if he generates a large percentage of the supplier's profits. Our evidence is also in line with the prediction of Fisman and Raturi (2004) that trade credit is larger when the product market is more competitive.
Finally, we do not find significant support for the Cun͂ at's (2007) hypothesis that trade credit is higher when the good sold is tailored to the buyer specific needs and suppliers and customers are in a sort of bilateral monopoly because of high switching costs. Interestingly, some of our proxies of bargaining power are a very close match to the theoretical predictions of the three models, as we observe the percentage of sales to the largest customer, the degree of sales concentration in the product market, and the percentage of goods sold tailored to the buyer's specific needs.
Our analysis also complements and extends the empirical literature. Extant evidence is based mainly on the decision to extend trade credit and its link with the degree of competition in product markets, but presents somewhat conflicting results (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fisman and Raturi, 2004) . We use a comprehensive set of measures on both trade credit terms and bargaining power that allows us to obtain more compelling evidence of a negative relation between supplier bargaining power and trade credit provision.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature analyzing the role of trade credit in developing economies (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fisman and Love, 2003; Johnson McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Cull, Xu and Zhu, 2008) . The general idea in this literature is that trade credit can offer a viable substitute for formal bank credit in countries with low levels of financial development. Cull, Xu and Zhu (2008) do not find support for this theory in a sample of Chinese firms.
1 Rather, they argue that the high growth rate in China is fueled by a growing private sector with increasing competitive pressure, which is likely to be an important motivation for the use of trade credit. Our results are in line with their argument.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical literature and derives our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 discusses a series of robustness checks and additional results. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature and testable hypotheses
The traditional explanation for the existence of trade credit is that trade credit plays a nonfinancial role. That is, trade credit reduces transaction costs (Ferris, 1981) , allows price discrimination between customers with different credit-worthiness (Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner, 1988) , fosters long-term relations with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002) , and even provides a warranty for quality when customers cannot observe product characteristics (Long, Malitz and Ravid, 1993) . More recently, financial theories argue that suppliers have a lending advantage over financial institutions, due to better information (Biais and Gollier, 1997), lower borrower's opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) , or a liquidation advantage (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010 
Data and Summary Statistics
We use firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms, which was collected as part of the Table 2 for the full sample. Table 3 divides the sample in two groups, firms that offer trade credit (AR_dum=1) and firms that do not offer trade credit (AR_dum=0), and shows the mean difference and its statistical significance for all our explanatory variables, including firm's characteristics (Panel A) and our proxies of bargaining power (Panel B). Table 4 breaks down one proxy of bargaining power between firms offering and not offering trade credit, across all sectors and the main firm's characteristics. Finally, Table 5 shows correlation matrices for all variables. Finally, we find that 20% of firms that offer trade credit offer a prepayment discount (AR_discount).
Trade credit variables
Our data set also allows us to examine the payment performance of customers (i.e., the collection of accounts receivables). First, we construct a dummy variable (AR_daysover) equal to one if the days actually used to repay are greater than the days offered by suppliers (customers pay late); the dummy is equal to 0 otherwise, i.e., when customers pay on time or prepay. In our sample, 28% of the firms receive late payments, 35% of firms receive early payments, and 37%
receive timely payments. Next, we compute the percentage of annual sales that involve overdue payments (AR_overdue). We find that on average 19% of the annual sales involve overdue payments.
Sample comparisons
We perform a number of empirical tests to verify that our sample is representative of China at the national level and we compare the use of trade credit in China versus other developing and developed economies. First, Cull et al. (2008) use a large data set of over 100,000 industrial private Chinese firms and find an average percentage of sales financed by accounts receivable of 18%.
There are some differences on the use of trade credit in comparison to the U.S..
According to the Federal Reserve Survey of Small Business Financing (SSBF) database of U.S.
firms, about 65% of firms use trade credit (account payables) to finance supplier purchases, as opposed to 45% in our sample of Chinese firms. Furthermore, the percentage of purchases financed by trade credit is 20% among U.S. SMEs that take trade credit from suppliers (versus 10% in our sample of Chinese firms) and 20% of firms that use trade credit are offered an early payment discount from their suppliers (in comparison to 7% in our sample of Chinese firms). 4 In summary, the Chinese trade credit data is representative of the country, highly comparable to the average in developed and developing countries, and not too different compared to the U.S.
Firm and industry characteristics
We include in all regressions some general firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with trade credit. First, the number of years since the firm was established in logarithm (Age). Second, the number of total employees (including contractual employees) in log (Emp), as a proxy for firm size. All our empirical results are robust to using alternative measures of firm size, such as dummies indicating small, medium, and large firms. Likewise, we get similar results if we replace the log of total employment with the log of total sales, although we are less comfortable using accounting data because of the large number of missing observations and unaudited firms in our sample. Third, we include the log of the number of customers the supplier is dealing with (No_customers), to account for any mechanical relation between the number of customers and the likelihood to offer trade credit or the amount offered. Fourth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of the firm owned by foreign individuals, foreign investors, foreign firms, and foreign banks is greater than 50%, and equal to zero otherwise (Foreign). Fifth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of the firm owned by the government (national, state, and local government, and cooperative/collective enterprises) is greater than 50% (State). We include these ownership dummy variables to control for possible preferential access to financing from foreign and stateowned banks, respectively. It might also be the case that foreign and state-owned firms have preferential foreign and government product markets, respectively, and are not as sensitive to market competition. In our sample, 7% of firms are foreign-owned, while 23% are state-owned.
All results are robust to using a 30% cutoff (instead of 50% cutoff) to identify foreign and state ownership. Sixth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm sells its products abroad and equal to zero otherwise (Export). We include this variable to control for possible differences in trade credit use among national and foreign customers. In our sample, 9% of firms are identified as exporters.
Next, we control for the firm's liquidity, using the percentage of unused lines of credit (LC_unused). This variable is equal to zero if the firm does not have a line of bank credit. The average percentage of unused credit line is 7% in our sample. However, less than 30% of the firms have access to a line of credit from the banking sector and of these firms' lines of credit, 26% are unused. The low-level of financial access to the formal credit market suggests that many
Chinese firms are likely to be credit-constrained. Table 3 shows that firms that extend trade credit (with AR_dum=1) are significantly more likely to be mature, larger, foreign and state-owned firms, export firms and firms with a larger unused line of credit than firms that do not offer any trade credit (with AR_dum=0).
All regressions also include 17 city dummies and 12 industry dummies that corresponds to 2-digit NACE codes, which is the finest level of available sector classification. 5 Industry dummies are supposed to control for the role of "industry standards" in setting trade credit contract terms. 6 Additional detailed information is available on the firm's "main business" line.
However, this information cannot be used in our regression analysis, as there are 1,818 different classifications and 99% of them include only one firm. Nevertheless, we study trade credit patterns of firms within a few classifications that include more than 10 firms. For instance, 33
firms are classified as "dress manufacturing", which is a subsector of the 2-digit sector "Garment and Leather Products". On average, 31% of dress manufacturing firms extend trade credit (versus 34% of the larger 2-digit sector they belong to). For the 11 firms that extend trade credit to their customers, the percentage of sales offered ranges from 10% to 100% (the median is 20%); terms offered include 3, 4, 10, 30, 40, and 90 days; and three firms (27%) offer a discount.
These statistics are very similar to the overarching 2-digit sector, where the median percentage of goods sold on credit is 18% and 22% offer a discount. When we look at other narrow industry classifications, we find similar patterns. This small exercise suggests that our 2-digit industry classification is appropriate to control for the role of industry standards in setting trade credit terms.
Measures of Bargaining Power
Our next set of explanatory variables concerns the bargaining power of the firm with respect to its customers. First, we measure the importance of the firm's largest customer using the percentage of total sales that normally goes to the firm's largest customer (Sales_largest_cust). On average, 25% of total sales go to the firm's largest customer. A larger share implies a more important customer and thus a weaker supplier's bargaining power.
Second, we measure the firm's bargaining power with the number of suppliers (including the firm itself) used by its largest customer (No_supl_cust). If the main customer uses many suppliers, it is less dependent on the firm -i.e., ending the relationship poses less of a risk of a holdup problem -and consequently this implies less market power for the firm, relative to its customer. Half of the firms in our sample deal with customers that have less than six suppliers and the average number of suppliers used by the firm's largest customer is nine. Only 10% of firms have customers dealing with more than 20 suppliers.
Third, we construct a Herfindahl Index to measure the degree of competition in the domestic market. Specifically, for the main business line we have information on the percentage of total sales in the domestic market supplied by the firm and by its main competitor and the total number of competitors in this market. This information is only available for a sub-sample of firms. Given that we do not know the market shares of all the competitors (but the main one), we assume that they are all equal. 7 This assumption implies that our continuous variable is a very noisy measure of sales' concentration in the domestic market. As a result, we use a dummy variable (Herfindahl) equal to one if the concentration index is larger than the median value (0.21) and zero otherwise. A higher value of the concentration index implies a less competitive product market and therefore a stronger bargaining power of suppliers relative to their customers. 7 The Herfindahl index is calculated as follows: Herfindahl =(x/100) 2 +(y/100
, where x and y are the firm's and the main competitor's market share, respectively. Ncomp is the total number of competitors but the main one.
As a measure of bargaining power, we also include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has introduced a new product, or service, or business line, in the past year, assuming that this event would require the firm to compete with a new product (New_product). Moreover, we proxy for broader changes in the competitive landscape with a dummy equal to one if, relative to the average of the previous year, the firm has lowered average prices on its main business line (Lowered_price). We implicitly assume this was a response to greater competitive pressures in the market. In our sample, 42% of suppliers have introduced a new product or service and 48% have lowered their prices. Finally, product characteristics can affect the seller-buyer relationship and thus the relative bargaining power. Following Cun͂ at (2007), we measure the strength of the seller-buyer relationship with the percentage of sales made to the clients' unique specification (Customized). The distribution of this variable is highly skewed. Half of the firms in our sample have less than 10% of customized sales, but the average percentage of sales made to clients' unique specification is 37%. Tables 3 and 4 provide preliminary evidence of a positive relation between weaker bargaining power and trade credit supply. Table 3 , Panel B shows that firms extending trade credit (with AR_dum=1) have a weaker bargaining power than firms that do not offer trade credit (with AR_d=0), using all our proxies of market power, except the percentage of sales made to the clients' unique specification. Table 4 breaks down the information in Table 3 , Panel B and reports the mean value of Lower_price for firms that do and do not offer trade credit, disaggregated by sectors and firm's characteristics. Table 4 strengthens our previous findings.
Specifically, firms offering trade credit are more likely to operate in competitive markets than firms that do not offer trade credit in all sectors, and significantly so in nine sectors out of 12.
Moreover, both young and mature firms, small and large firms, foreign and non foreigncontrolled firms, state and non state-controlled firms that offer trade credit are all more likely to operate in competitive markets than firms that do not offer trade credit. We obtain very similar results if we replace AR_dum with the percentage of goods sold of credit (AR_per) below and above the median as an indicator of trade credit supply.
Results
In this section, we first investigate the relation between different aspects of trade credit and the supplier's bargaining power. We then examine how bank credit constraints interact with the supply of trade credit with different degrees of bargaining power. Table 6 shows the results of a set of regressions where the dependent variable is the decision to offer trade credit, which represents the traditional dependent variable used in the literature. In Table 7 , we exploit the richness of our data and look at the determinants of other trade credit terms. All regressions control for general firm characteristics, for 12 industry fixedeffects, and for 17 city fixed-effects. Table 6 shows consistent evidence that a weaker supplier's bargaining power has a positive and statistically significant effect on the supplier's decision to offer trade credit. For instance in Column 1, the larger the percentage of sales to the largest customer, the more likely firms are to extend trade credit, in line with our first testable hypothesis in Section 2. Moreover, the degree of competition faced by the supplier in the product market affects the decision to offer trade credit, in line with Fisman and Raturi (2004) and our second testable hypothesis: the larger the number of suppliers of the firm's most important customer (Column 2), or the lower the degree of sale concentration in the domestic market (Column 3), the more likely firms are to extend trade credit. In addition, firms that have lowered prices in the past year (Column 4) or introduced new products (Column 5) are more likely to extend trade credit. Finally, we include the percentage of sales made to clients' unique specification (Column 6) to test our third hypothesis. We find that selling a larger proportion of customized goods does not have a significant effect on the decision to offer trade credit.
Trade credit provision and the supplier's bargaining power
As for the other firm characteristics, there is some evidence that younger firms are more likely to offer trade credit (Column 1). The negative relation between firm's age and trade credit supply could depend on the stronger competition that new firms face when entering the product market. Moreover, larger firms are more likely to extend trade credit (Column 1), which might be related to their longer and more established customer and supplier relationships. Our finding that larger and younger firms offer more trade credit is not necessarily counterintuitive in a developing country context, where firms often remain small over time (and fail to grow as they age); for instance, the correlation between firm size and age in our sample is only 0.30 percent.
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There is consistent evidence that firms with important foreign equity ownership and firms with a large number of customers have a higher probability to offer trade credit (Columns 1 to 6). In general, we find no significant relationship between the decision to offer trade credit and state ownership. Finally, there is some evidence that exporting firms have a lower probability of offering trade credit (Columns 2 and 4 to 6), which might be explained by the difficulty in collecting late payments overseas or litigating in a foreign court. Table 7 extends the analysis to the effect of bargaining power on the other trade credit terms. The dependent variable is either the percentage of goods sold on credit (AR_per), or the offered payment period (AR_days), or the decision to offer a prepayment discount (AR_discount). We also look at the customers' payment history including the difference between the number of days used versus offered to repay (AR_daysover), and the share of overdue payments (AR_overdue).
9 Specifically, Table 7 shows that our proxies of low bargaining power, namely suppliers dealing with important customers (Panel A) and facing increased competition in the product market (Panel B), are associated with a larger share of goods sold on account and longer payment periods offered before imposing penalties. We do not find evidence that the supplier's bargaining power affects the likelihood to offer a prepayment discount. This is consistent with the finding of Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2012) that discounts for early payment are offered to riskier buyers to limit their potential non-payment risk. When we look at the other firm's characteristics, Table 7 shows that larger firms have more goods sold on credit and a lower share of overdue payments (Columns 1 and 5 in Panels A and B). We do not find significant relationships between foreign ownership and credit terms.
State-owned firms are associated with customers extending the payment period beyond what has been offered by their suppliers (Column 4 in both panels).
Overall our findings provide empirical support for our testable hypotheses 1 and 2 and are consistent with the idea that trade credit might be used as a competitive device to reduce actual competition, prevent entry, attract new customers or avoid losing the existing ones. In all these cases, trade credit can become crucial for the survival of the firm. For example, a one-standard deviation positive shock to product market competition (measured by Sales_largest_cust)
increases the likelihood to offer trade credit (AR_dum) by about 0.14 percentage points, which represents 36% of the average likelihood. The same shock also increases the share of goods sold on credit (AR_per) by about 3%, which corresponds to about 20% of the average amount of trade credit offered. Both figures suggest that the effect of competition on trade credit supply is economically very relevant. The economic significance is even stronger when we use other measures of bargaining power like Lower_price or New_product.
How do suppliers in competitive market finance trade credit provision?
In our sample, 847 firms offer trade credit and 81% of them have no credit lines.
Suppliers offering trade credit are more likely to have a larger unused credit line (LC_unused), as shown in Table 3 . Overall this preliminary evidence suggests that the lack of bank financing is likely to affect trade credit decisions. However, when we control for unused bank credit lines in a regression analysis, we do not find any significant effect on trade credit supply, in line with previous evidence (i.e., Giannetti, et al., 2011) . 11 This section explores further the relation among suppliers' credits constraints and the decision to offer trade credit, conditioning on the supplier's bargaining power.
More specifically, Table 8 having an unused credit line has no effect on trade credit decisions when suppliers have stronger bargaining power towards their customers. For example, the firms whose most important customer relies on more than 10 input providers are more likely to offer trade credit and sell a larger share of goods on account when they hold a larger proportion of unused credit lines Overall, these findings provide empirical support to our testable Hypothesis 4.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks. We first investigate whether our findings can be consistent with the supplier's information advantage hypothesis and with the warrantee for product quality theory. We then show that our results still hold when we replicate our analysis for some selected industries and subsamples of firms.
Bargaining power versus information advantage
One could argue that the percentage of sales to the biggest customer (Sales_largest_cust) could also capture an advantage in information requisition by the supplier, which leads him to provide credit to his customer, as theoretically shown by Bias and Gollier (1997) or Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) . If this is the case, we should find that our proxy of bargaining power is not significant anymore, once we control for the supplier having some information advantages over the buyer's project quality, or about the buyer's deception of other firms.
We measure the supplier's information advantage in three different ways. First, our survey asks the supplier whether he would be able to find out if one of his main clients deceives another firm. We use this survey question to construct a dummy variable that takes value equal to one for a positive answer and zero otherwise (Info_adv). Our second and third proxies are based on the idea that the supplier's information advantage is a natural by-product of its business. Suppliers are often in the same industry as their clients and they often visit their customers' premises.
Therefore the information advantage is likely to depend on the proximity between buyers and suppliers and on the length of their relationship. Our survey provides information on the percentage of sales to customers located in five different areas: in the same district as the supplier's plant, outside the same district but within the same city, outside the same city but within the same province, outside the same province by within the same country or overseas. We measure customer's proximity by the percentage of sales going to customers located in the local market, i.e., in the same district or in the same city (Local_market). Finally, we use the average length of the buyer-supplier relation as a proxy of information advantage (Age_rel_customer).
Panel A, B and C of Table 9 show the results of these robustness tests for the decision to offer hold for the other dependent variables, such as the payment period actually used by customers (AR_daysover) and the percentage of overdue payments (AR_overdue).
Bargaining power versus product quality
The finding that firms introducing new products are more likely to extend trade credit could also be interpreted as evidence of the warranty for product quality check theory, as suggested by Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) . Since a new product involves quality uncertainty, trade credit could be offered to give the buyer the possibility to check the product quality before the payment is due. Alternatively, in line with Lee and Stowe (1993), the New_product variable could be interpreted as a proxy for complexity, suggesting that product risk and asymmetric information on the product market that increase with complexity could explain why firms offer trade credit.
We can control for these alternative interpretations using the percentage of sales carrying a warrantee (Warranty) and the percentage of products that are certified (Certified). When products are sold with a warranty, the buyer can return the good without incurring in extra costs, if the quality of the good does not meets the expected standards. Similarly, if the product sold is certified, product risk and asymmetric information should be lower. Thus, if the New_product variable proxies for quality checking needs or for the degree of complexity and uncertainty, rather than for bargaining power, it should not be statistically significant once we control for the provision of the warranty and the certification. Table 10 shows that the variable New_product is indeed still significant with the expected sign in all the regressions, while the percentage of sales carrying a warrantee and the percentage of certified products do not seem to significantly affect the decision to offer trade credit, the proportion of goods sold on credit, or the offered payment periods.
Bargaining power and cross-sectional variation
Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional variation in trade credit supply and proxies of bargaining power. Table 4 provides descriptive evidence of a positive correlation between trade credit supply and bargaining power across most of the sectors in our sample and across firm's characteristics. These preliminary findings are confirmed in our regression analysis, where we control for firm's characteristics and 12 sector dummies. To provide further evidence that trade credit terms offered are not only exclusively driven by industry standards, in Finally, although our data does not allow us to exploit the time-series variability of trade credit supply and bargaining power variables, some questions in the survey refer to past firm 12 Regression results are not reported here, but are available upon request.
activity and limited accounting information is available, both for the current and the previous three years. We use this limited time-series information to control for potential idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level. For example, we construct a set of dummy variables to control for whether the firm increased sales, fixed assets, or the number of total employees in the past three years. These dummies are insignificant and do not affect our main results.
Conclusion
This paper uses firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms to study trade credit terms offered by suppliers and the payment history of customers. Supplier financing is often overlooked in the capital structure literature, although it is arguably the most important source of financing for small and medium sized enterprises, particularly in countries with less developed financial markets. We show that firms use trade credit as a competitive gesture. More specifically, suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit and better credit terms to powerful and important customers, who also are more likely to force payment periods longer than the ones offered and to generate overdue payments. Being credit constrained by banks prevents weaker suppliers from offering trade credit and thus reduces their ability to compete in the product market.
If competition is one of the main drivers of the decision to offer trade credit, why do firms not simply reduce the product price instead of offering a trade credit discount? A price reduction is not necessarily simpler than offering trade credit. A price reduction is observable by competitors and can trigger their immediate reaction by causing a price war that can be detrimental for the full industry. Trade credit is a less aggressive and more flexible instrument.
Moreover, the two instruments -price reduction and trade credit -could also be used as complement strategies. In our analysis, we use the variable Lower_price as an indicator of competition and find that firms that lowered their prices relative to the previous year are more likely to offer trade credit. This finding could be interpreted indeed as evidence of complementarity.
We believe that our results shed light on trade credit behavior more broadly than the Chinese market. Unique features of the Chinese economy -such as the bias towards state-owned banks and state-owned firms -have been decreasing since 2001 (two years before our survey takes place) and we control for potential biases. Moreover, there are no country-specific regulations on inter-firm financing. Finally, this paper focuses on the role of competition on trade credit decisions. While competition is relatively new in China, it is a widespread common feature of developed and market-based economies. The percent of the number of the firm's products that are certified 46.57 We show estimates of OLS regressions in columns (1) and (5) and logit regressions in columns (2) -(4). AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than the sector average before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy indicating if the firm offers a pre-payment discount on credit to its customers. AR_daysover is a dummy equal to one when the number of days used to repay are larger than the days offered.
Measures of Trade Credit
AR_overdue is the percentage of annual sales that involves overdue payment. We report estimates of logit regressions in Columns (1) and (3), and of OLS regressions in Column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than 30 before imposing penalties. Panel A, B, and C control for whether the supplier has information on customer's deception (Info_adv), for the proximity of customers (Local_market), and for the age of the supplier/customer relation (Age_customer_rel), respectively. We report estimates of logit regressions in columns (1) and (3) and of OLS regressions in column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than 30 before imposing penalties. Panels A and B control for the percentage of goods carrying a warrantee (Warrantee) and for the proportion of firm's products that are certified (Certified), respectively. We report estimates of logit regressions in column (1) and (3) and of OLS regressions in column (2). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. Panels A and B show the results for two large sectors, Auto and Auto Parts and Electronic Equipment, respectively. We use two different proxies of bargaining power, Sales_largest_cust in Columns (1) and (2) and Lower_price in Columns (3) and (4). 
